Introduction
In view of the "multilevel, multistage and nonlinear design of international integra tion processes" [Kashirkina, Morozov, 2012, p. 17] , all integration associations endeav or to attain their objectives by searching for and utilizing regulatory methods and tools that ensure the most appropriate balance between the interests of an association and those of its members. Such balance allows an association to better achieve the intended aims [Lenaerts, Nuffel, 2011, р. 134] without developing biases or giving preference to decisions at a "better" level of government and without the excessive overlapping inter vention of public bodies in each other's competences.
The law of integration associations is special. Created in all cases on the basis of international treaties, integration law retains some elements of international law [Iu mashev, 2006, p. 75] , but it also penetrates the national legislative frameworks of mem bers by substantially modifying these frameworks and creating within them unified or harmonized regulatory tools to foster integration. In the process of development, integration law acquires specific features depending upon the goals of an integration association and the willingness of members to share their sovereignty. This may occur not only by handing over (delegating) certain authorities and elaborating practices of coordinated interaction with supranational institutions, but also by using national regu latory tools to secure the implementation of legislative acts of associations, their insti tutions and governing bodies in states and in relation to their citizens. To analyze these features, this paper studies two integration associations, the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which have chosen different pathways of integration -a communitarian one and conventional (traditional) one. The study is preceded by the short overview of these pathways.
Theoretical Background
It would be fair to say that scholars studying European integration do not pay much attention to analyzing methods of integration development. Most experts of European integration are more interested in evolution and justification of the supranational na ture of the EU and its legal, economic and institutional aspects [Majone, 2009, р. 2] rather than in examining the tools and means of attainment of supranational objectives. It feels like this preferential focus on supranational aspects of European integration may be explained by a fear of undermining the consistent trend within the last 30 years (since the adoption of the Single European Act, 2 which paved the way and formed the legislative basis for the comprehensive application of a communitarian method of legal integration in relation to almost all issues of integration development 3 ) to strengthen normative integration. Even the concepts of supranationalism and intergovernmental ism as key theoretical blocks of European integration policy have been infused with a strictly contextual meaning.
Usually, researchers in European integration matters consider supranationalism as an extension of integration development, while intergovernmentalism has become a somewhat negative notion as it appears to be closely related to regionalism and even separatism, and thus not beneficial in the context of supranational integration [Mid delaar, 2013, p. 5] . Leaving aside the semantic details of supranationalism and intergov ernmentalism as ideas that have been already widely studied not only in the international but also in Russian literature [Varlamova, 2014; Meshcheriakova, 2014; Chirkin, 2016] , it would be true to say that, being the essential concepts of communitarian and conven tional methods of integration, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism contribute to the achievement of integration development using their own, more relevant, tools.
For the communitarian method, such tools are legislation applied directly and on a priority basis as well as legal principles determining the application of such legislation while still configuring it. 4 This method is also called the "community method." Accord ing to the position outlined in the official document of the EU Commission, it involves the following key elements: the right of legislative initiative of the EU Commission; the responsibility of the EU Council and European Parliament to pass budgetary and legislative acts; participation of the EU Commission along with national parliaments in the execution of a single implementation policy in the EU territory; and a special role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in protecting and advancing EU legislation [EU Commission, 2001, p. 8] . As long as the communitarian method requires members to delegate some of their authorities to the integration association, supranational institutions here play a key role as the actors that adopt supranational acts and engage as facilitators between states in their relationships with each other and with the EU over disputes emerging in relation to the delegation of authorities, while integration itself is positioned as " [national] sovereignty tamed" [Magnette, 2000, p. 117] . The conventional method, on the contrary, recognizes that states, or more exact ly, their governments as key players in making integration decisions, are superior in the development and pursuit of integration aims [Puetter, 2014, pp. 854-70] . According to this method, supranational decisions result from the interaction of national govern 2 The Single European Act has not only provided the EU Commission with a range of important functions in regulating the single domestic market and its social and environmental facets, but also improved the judiciary system by creating a court of first instance. These innovations have become major landmarks in the normative integration of the EU.
3 Excluding such sensitive areas, which later were given special regulatory status, as foreign policy and security policy, equity, justice, cooperation of the police and the judiciary. 4 This is a specific characteristic of the evolvement of EU law where two streams of the European legal tradition meet -RomanoGermanic law and common law [Moorhead, 2012, рp. 126-43]. ments and their coordinated efforts, and so this method is also theoretically called the method of intergovernmental integration [Uçarer, 2013, p. 293] .
While theoretically different, in practice the communitarian and conventional methods of integration have many tangency points. When one method is used some as pects of the other are also applied. It is important to note that since both methods have the common subject of regulation (integration and integration relations), it does not make practical sense to force an exclusiveness of application of any of these methods taken separately. Thus, communitarian integration that mostly takes place in the EU abounds with examples of when intergovernmental tools are used to ensure a better at tainment of objectives of regulatory development. One can talk here not only about an active lawmaking role for the intergovernmental EU Council, which is a colegislator in the EU along with the European Parliament, but also about countless socalled de novo bodies of collective decisionmaking 5 created at the level of ministers and public servants representing national governments and positioned to deal with a number of crucial complex technical issues. In this regard, the purpose of this article is not to counter one integration model with the other, but to reveal elements that may be useful for ensuring a better achievement of core aims pursued in the process of integration.
legal Integration in the European Union
The EU follows the communitarian model of integration, which was conceptually de scribed in the Van Gend et Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen case as follows: "The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals."entered into by national governments and ratified by national parliaments, but rather acts passed by the European Parliament and/or the EU Council that are supposed to be applied in full by individuals in the meaning set forth by the CJEU.
Legislative Tools of Legal Integration in the EU
The EU adheres to the intra vires rule, i.e. it acts only within the jurisdiction out lined in the founding treaties to pursue aims defined in these treaties. If a competence is not directly transferred to the EU by the treaties, it belongs to the members. This approach reflects the practice of vesting the EU with competences that was established in 1950s and still exists: members delegate authority in certain policy areas not entirely, but only in relation to some aspects that are clearly described in special enabling articles of the founding treaties -the socalled "legal bases." 8 To exercise its regulating competences the EU uses legislative acts. According to Article 289 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro pean Union (TFEU) [EU, 2012] , a regulating act adopted by the EU becomes an EU legislative act if it meets three conditions simultaneously: it is passed in the form of a regulation, directive or decision; it is adopted by the European Parliament and/or the EU Council; and it is adopted through the legislative procedure.
In 1992, at the Edinburgh summit, the European Council stated that "the form of action should be as simple as possible consistent with satisfactory achievement of the objective…The Community should legislate only to the extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations" [cited in Lenaerts, 1993, p. 885] . This approach has changed the legislative culture of the EU. With the intro duction of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU "legislated less often (subsidiarity per se) and in a less intrusive manner" [Cooper, 2017, p. 36] , mainly using directives as a form of regulation.
According to Article 288 of the TFEU [EU, 2012] a directive is a legislative instru ment that makes it possible to avoid excessive regulation of relations at the EU level and leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods used to achieve their aims. But the problem is that every member of the EU, being an addressee of a direc tive, incorporates its provisions into domestic national legislation with a different de gree of loyalty. As a result, implementation gaps occur from time to time in EU states, and some states bear much more of the expense associated with the implementation of a directive (legal, political, economic, social and environmental) as compared to other states. This factor complicates legal integration in the EU based on the principle of regulation via directives. To mitigate this negative effect, the CJEU has taken the ap proach described below.
Implementation of Legislative Acts in the EU
Implementation of EU legislation is decentralized and based on the idea that in terested individuals have a serious intention to exert control over the observance of EU legislation regulating their rights and freedoms. "The vigilance of individuals con cerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to… the diligence of the Commission [EU] ." 9 Civil actions by individuals play a greater role in legal integration of the EU as an instrument of pressure on national authorities for re sponsible and timely implementation of EU directives, as an alternative to the central ized supervision by the EU Commission.
N. V. Varlamova [2014, p. 13] argues that the EU has no "'regional' and 'local' public agencies enforcing implementation of [EU] decisions." This is done by national authorities as they act as main implementors of EU law, and they are presumably liable for the damage affecting rights of individuals, including damage due to nonimplemen tation or improper implementation of EU directives.
Starting with its first decision made in 1963 in the Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 10 case, the CJEU has stressed that protection of rights of individuals has been conducted by the Court in addition to protection provided by the Commission and the members. The CJEU reinforced this position later, in 1991, in the Francovich v. Italy 11 case, where it confirmed a duty of members to consider actions filed against them by individuals for damages affecting rights of individuals incurred due to nondischarge or improper discharge of an obligation to implement EU direc tives. Finally, with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU has been author ized to impose fines and penalties on EU members not only for nonimplementation of its decisions, but also if a state has not reported to the EU Commission on measures taken to implement a EU directive within a certain time limit (Article 260, Para 3 of the TFEU) [EU, 2012] .
This feature of legal integration in the EU -the use of instruments and means of national states -secures the efficiency of EU law in the framework of national le gal systems, where national public institutions, according to G. Ellinek [2004, p. 413] , having the "dominant nature," are endowed with a constitutional power based on the will of the voters to use tools forcing their citizens to comply with legal requirements of the EU. After all, it also explains why institutions implementing regulating compe tences of the EU try to have the process of adoption of EU legislative acts, as far as possible, brought into maximum proximity with citizens and take into account local, regional and national characteristics of relations that these acts regulate through in stitutionalization of involvement into the EU legislative process of bodies -national parliaments -that are directly formed by citizens of states and that are politically ac countable to their citizens.
Judicial Review of Adoption of EU Legislative Acts
The role of the CJEU in validating and developing supranational legal regulation cannot be overstated. Not envisaged in the founding treaties of the EU, the doctrine of direct effect of EU law and the doctrine of supremacy of EU law are "products of judgemade law" [Waele, Vleuten, 2013, p. 645] by their origin and nature. It is true to say that legal evolution of the EU in general occurs within the reference system estab lished by the CJEU. Thus, in the canonic Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman 12 case, the CJEU held that the EU possessed an exclu sive competence to regulate the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the EU. With these arguments in mind, the CJEU has repeatedly delivered decisions in favour of the EU even in those cases in which the EU had not had an appropriate regulating competence under provisions of EU founding treaties (for example, in the areas of education, 13 and culture and sports 14 ). Today, regulating competences of the EU are rigidly restricted to issues delegated to it by members through the abovementioned legal bases. EU acts without a legal ba sis or which do not follow it to the full extent are regarded as symbolic and contravening the principle of conferral of powers. These acts must be abolished under Article 263 of the TFEU [EU, 2012] , which allows the CJEU to supervise the legitimacy of the adop tion of EU legislative acts.
In 1992, the CJEU in the France v Commission case held that express indication of the legal bases must be included in any EU legislative act, and the absence of such indication results in the act being declared null and void by the CJEU. 15 However, this decision has not had an influence on the further law enforcement practice of the CJEU. Not a single EU legislative act challenged by members as being passed without sufficient justification 16 has been abolished or declared void. At the very best, the CJEU was just reiterating the content of the recital of a legislative act, 17 relying on the opinion of EU institutions that had elaborated the act in resolving the question of necessity of its adoption; 18 at the worst the CJEU provided a mere statement of the proposing institutions that achievement of the aims of an intended action "necessarily presup poses Communitywide action"
19 without any accompanying analysis of factual cir cumstances.
It is definitely impossible in a system based on legal and democratic values to dis regard the capability of a court to denote errors of lawmakers in relation to the com pliance with rules and procedures determining how lawmakers should exercise their regulating competences. However, any appeal to a more demanding role for the CJEU in policing boundaries of EU legislative competencies [Kumm, 2006, p. 503] poses cer tain risks of disrupting the institutional balance. In the multilevel constitutional system of the EU, various institutions -participants of the EU lawmaking process having dif ferent political views -are involved in determining a level of government for a legisla tive action. If, making a decision on an EU legislative act that has already been passed by the EU Council and/or European Parliament, the CJEU voices concerns about the improper level of adoption of this act, it inevitably puts itself in a situation in which it must face opposition of a qualified majority of members that believe action at the EU level is required as they supported this action at the lawmaking stage [Craig, 2012, p. 81] . This can create the grounds for accusing the court of "rampant judicial activism" [Toth, 1994, p. 48] . For this reason, the CJEU prefers not to undermine its reputa tion as an "instrument… of constitutionalization… of communitarian law" [Varlamova, 2014, p. 17] . As a rule it does not engage in political interinstitutional disputes, thus remaining a purely legal institution delivering decisions that are binding for all partici pants of integration relations.
legal Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
According to T. Risse [2015, p. 1] , the institutional design of the EAEU "resembles the EU to a large extent -with one exception: the [EAEU] does not contain provisions to build supranational institutions, it remains intergovernmental."
Russian researchers correctly indicate that national governments play a major role in the EAEU decisionmaking process, while EAEU institutions "just provide a platform for their [national governments'] interaction" [Strezhneva, 2016, p. 6] . Even though some institutions have certain supranational features and, therefore according to T. Neshataeva, the EAEU can be regarded as an "organization of the supranational type" [2015] , it is still impossible to consider EAEU law as a supranational legal frame work in its pure form and within the meaning that has been elaborated and maintained in the EU system. Certain supranational features can be traced in the Eurasian Economic Commis sion (EEC) which is empowered with regulating authority, and in the EAEU Court which is granted authority to ensure the consistent application of international treaties and decisions of EAEU bodies. At the same time, the EAEU Court does not examine appeals by citizens of states related to violations of their rights and freedoms by national legislation passed, for example, in contradiction to decisions of the EEC. This is be cause decisions of the EEC, despite being subject to direct application in the territories of states, are not given an absolute priority recognized at both Eurasian and national levels over national legislative acts.
Created on the grounds of the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union, dated 29 May 2014 [EAEU, 2014] EAEU law mostly keeps features of international law as, expand ing its regulating potential, it relies on international treaties and EAEU decisions that are not contradictory to these treaties -decisions by EAEU institutions such as the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council and the EEC (EAEU, 2014, Sect. 6, Clause 1, Para. 5]. In accordance with the decisions of these EAEU bodies, single rules of behaviour for citizens 20 of states are being created in the EAEU, but these single rules do not form an independent and selfsufficient legal order for its participants, as they are adopted by EAEU bodies within their mandates provided not only by the EAEU Treaty but also by other international treaties rati fied by states within the EAEU. Thereby, EAEU institutions originally do not possess founding authority to create a supranational level of legal norms which would have its own scope of regulation independent of other international treaties and an application mechanism not constrained with special national procedures relating to these norms. This is one of the things that prevents EAEU acts from asserting an absolute application priority over acts of EAEU members.
Instruments of Legal Integration in the EAEU
In addition to international treaties, instruments of legal integration in the EAEU are acts adopted by EAEU bodies and containing regulatory norms. As long as inter national treaties do not directly serve goals of supranational legal integration, the focus can be on the second element existing in the EAEU legal arena -acts of EAEU bodies. These acts possess features that make legal integration in the EAEU very "intergovern mentally specific."
First, EAEU acts are adopted by EAEU bodies within mandates provided by in ternational treaties ratified by national governments within the EAEU [EAEU, 2014, Sect. 6, Clause 1]. Second, there is a rigid hierarchy of EAEU acts that suggests that decisions of the EEC are subordinate to decisions of the Supreme Council and Inter governmental Council [Sect. 6, Clause 4]. Third, acts of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council are directed to EAEU members and are supposed to be 20 Here, actors in question are economic units, i.e. entities registered in a manner prescribed by national legislation, including legal entities and selfemployed entrepreneurs. applied in a way determined by their national legislation. At the same time, the Treaty does not explicitly state the binding nature of acts of the Supreme Council and Inter governmental Council on the institutions of states.
The EEC stands out in this context, as its acts, being subordinate to the legal sys tem of the EAEU (in relation to acts of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmen tal Council), are still directed to citizens (economic units) of states and are generally applicable in the territories of states according to Clause 13 of the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission that is annexed to the Treaty. These valuable features ensure the supranational nature of acts, but unfortunately the significance of these fea tures for Eurasian legal integration is devalued because the priority of acts of the EEC over acts of national law is not recognized at the EAEU level. Members do not share a single approach to this issue.
For example, the constitution of the Russian Federation does not state the su premacy of legally binding decisions of international organizations and their institu tions over domestic legislation. The constitution of the Republic of Belarus directly provides that acts of intergovernmental associations must be subordinate to the nation al legal system. They may be elevated to a higher level only if international treaties are made on their basis, with such treaties being not ultimately paramount but right below the constitution and constitutional acts [Vasilevich, 2009, p. 15] .
The Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a unique approach. According to Clause 3 of Article 4 of Kazakhstan's constitution, ratified international treaties have priority over laws and are applied directly, except in situations when an international treaty requires adoption of a law of the Republic of Kazakhstan. To develop further this constitutional provision, on 5 November 2009 the Constitutional Council of the Re public of Kazakhstan passed a special resolution 21 establishing that acts of international organizations created pursuant to ratified international treaties and acts of their bodies are included within the national legal system through abovementioned international treaties. If an international treaty ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan states that acts of bodies of international organizations are of a binding nature for members, public authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan must adjust national legislation according to such acts. As a result, if a decision of the EEC contradicts a legislative act of the Repub lic of Kazakhstan, a decision of the EEC will have priority in the application scheme, and public authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan will have to amend national leg islation accordingly. Unfortunately, this approach to determining the role of acts of EAEU bodies in national legislation is not common to all EAEU members.
For supranational legal integration, it is critical not only to have a single statelevel legal approach to determining a role of supranational acts in national legal systems of members of an integration association [Kashirkina, Morozov, 2012, p. 251] , but also to ensure that founding acts of the association deal with this issue. S. V. Bakhin [2007, p. 126 ] is right when he writes that for the countries in the modern globalizing and in tegrating world, it is very important to construct a hierarchy that ranks national law and law of international treaties at the national law level, as well as "national law and law of an integration association" consisting of given members, but at the level of law of the integration association.
Judicial Review of Application of Legislation in the EAEU
As EAEU judge T. Neshataeva [2015] points out, supranational courts are created to ensure the unified interpretation and application of general legal rules, which they do by creating legal norms which "fasten all three types of legal regulation of integra tion relations: an international treaty, a norm passed by international bureaucracy and a norm passed by national bodies, including national courts." In relation to activities of the CJEU, this claim is correct; in relation to the EAEU Court, it is not: the EAEU Court is not empowered to solve such tasks. This should be examined in more detail.
As follows from Clause 2 of the Statute of the EAEU Court, annexed to the Treaty, the Court ensures the unified application of EAEU law resolving disputes regarding the issues of implementation of this law (Clause 39, Subclauses 1 and 2 of the Statute). However, the EAEU Court is not provided with the competence to endow EAEU bod ies with new functions in addition to those directly established by the Treaty and/or other international treaties ratified within the integration association (Clause 42 of the Statute).
Decisions of the EAEU Court "do not modify and do not override existing norms of EAEU law, national legislation and do not create new norms" (Clause 102 of the Statute), and prejudicial rulings of the EAEU Court do not have a binding nature for national jurisdictional bodies that are requested to deliver such rulings (Clause 98 of the Statute). Taking into consideration the critical importance of prejudicial rulings for set ting up a lawmaking and lawenforcement dialogue between supranational and nation al judicial bodies, the wording of Clause 98 of the Statute confirms, as A. S. Ispolinov argues, "the disregard of legislative acts of the integration association by member states, primarily by their national courts" [2017, p. 115] . This is the first competencerelated impediment created by the authors of the Treaty that makes it impossible to secure the unified interpretation and application of norms of EAEU law.
The second impediment is linked to the necessity of compliance with the proce dure of precourt mediation for disputes on the legitimacy of decisions of the EEC in terms of their conformity to international treaties and decisions of EAEU institutions. This procedure is applied in relation to disputes initiated not only by member states but also by economic units. The EAEU Court takes up a dispute only if an applicant previously submitted a claim to the EEC (Clause 43 of the Statute). At the same time, the Statute does not introduce a procedure of judicial appeal against the results of pre court mediation, which, for example, may be unsatisfactory for an economic unit if it still believes that its rights and legitimate interests granted by the Treaty have been violated by a decision of the EEC. Only if the EEC fails to take action may a dispute be taken up by the EAEU Court (Subclause 44 of the Statute). The rule demanding that applicants use the procedure of precourt mediation works as a bottleneck" for indi viduals and legal entities doing business in the EAEU as it significantly narrows their opportunities to be upheld by the court at the Eurasian level. While states can use al ternative methods to protect their interests and prerogative powers (for example, by ap pealing to the Supreme Council), economic units are unable to do so. 22 Unfortunately, this circumstance was either not addressed by the authors of Eurasian integration or, conversely, this tactic was intentionally used to "constrain activities and the broadening of authority of the [supranational] court" [Ispolinov, 2017, p. 116] .
The Formal Parliamentary Element in the EAEU
Another formal impediment of communitarian integration in the EAEU men tioned in the literature is that the EAEU lacks "the formal parliamentary element" [Likhachev, 2014] which would interact with other EAEU institutions in the process of making Eurasian decisions. However, the issue of supranational parliamentarism is not as clear as the issue of supranational courts and the experience of the EU proves it.
The presence of a supranational parliament itself does not ensure the supranation al nature of legal integration. The role of the European Parliament in legal integration in the EU is controversial. "European Parliament does not share many of the demo cratic credentials of national parliaments, remains distant from citizens and within the process of EU decisionmaking may be viewed as part of the legitimacy problem [in the EU]." [EU Select Committee, 2013, p. 40] . Today, Europe looks at national parlia ments as a means to protect democratic legitimacy to an extent that cannot be achieved by EU institutions themselves in the process of supranational legal integration. The Eu ropean Parliament is physically unable to replace national parliaments in regard to cer tain issues of legislative policy which fall within regulating competences of EU mem bers but which require the adoption of harmonization measures by the EU: national parliaments, being local, remain politically responsible for the situation in their states, and this positions them as unique bodies for elaborating EU legislative acts. Guided by these motives, the Lisbon Treaty developed as a founding element a special tool (the socalled subsidiarity control mechanism) which allows national parliaments to take part in the EU lawmaking process, not substituting the European Parliament, the EU Council or the EU Commission, but directly cooperating with them, as well as with each other, on the question of what level of government is proper regulating authority.
Perhaps, the EAEU should also turn to the national parliaments of its members as unique actors in the process of rendering Eurasian decisions. National parliaments, by participating, for example, in the exercise of regulating competences of the EEC could enhance the democratic legitimacy of its acts (through the same subsidiarity control mechanism evaluating the justification for delegation of certain functions and imple mentation of these functions at the level of the EEC), and contribute to a better local implementation. Being politically responsible to their voters, national parliaments can serve links between the EAEU and the citizens of its members, enabling citizens to take part (through their parliamentary representatives) at the Eurasian level in the devel opment and adoption of legislative acts regulating integration relations involving not just their states, but themselves. The attainment of parliamentary legitimacy of acts of EAEU bodies could definitely be an important step toward supranational legal integra tion, which is the aim that the EAEU wants to achieve. However, in order to turn an apprentice into a master, it is required not only to have an intention and spend time; it is necessary to have a better developed mechanism, from the institutional point of view, for the adoption of supranational decisions which would involve all participants of inte gration relations equally in the joint process of solving problems, rather than have them persistently advancing their own interests.
Conclusion
Of course, legal integration in the EU is completely different from legal integration within the EAEU from both the formal legal standpoint, as these associations follow different integration evolution pathways, and the practical standpoint, as they achieve different results. The EU and the EAEU have developed totally opposite mechanisms for adopting integration decisions, which have different natures.
Legislative acts passed in the EAEU are not given an absolute priority over acts of national legislation of its members, which results in a lack of consistency and unity on this issue among members -this was the key reason for focusing substantive research efforts on legislation of individual members of the EAEU while leaving aside relevant legislation of EU members). The EU faces precisely the reverse situation: its acts at the founding level (starting with the Single European Act) have created preconditions for endowing EU institutions with founding competences to compose an independent su pranational layer of legal acts that are superior and directly applied in the territories of states. States are cooperative and unified in how they follow the decisions of the CJEU and secure the proper implementation of acts of the EU Commission.
The utilization of capacity and tools of states for attaining integration development aims is the strategically beneficial approach to integration development. Good will and the consent of members of an integration association can help attain all ambitious aims in relation to integration. For this reason, the mechanism of adoption of decisions itself becomes a key element for the success of the subsequent implementation of these deci sions. And fortunately, the chosen method of integration development, even though it sets the appropriate tone for implementation processes, does not predetermine their outcome.
The communitarian method appeals to the legislative procedure of interinstitu tional interaction involving national parliaments, while the conventional method ap peals to intergovernmental negotiations. However, in both cases, decisionmaking ac tors endeavour to achieve the same outcome -to completely eliminate the possibility that supranational decisions may be inconvenient for national implementing authori ties [Glencross, 2014, p. 70] . This can be brought into action through the reconciliation of wills of decisionmaking actors on the basis of their dialogue. The most effective collective decisions are taken on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of priority of the will of majority. Here, a consensus is supposed to be reached via the interinsti tutional dialogue (interinstitutional consensus) of decisionmaking actors localized at various levels of integration management. It is crucial to directly involve those who will be responsible for implementation of these decisions locally. The EU lawmaking process is characterized by the multipolarity and complexity of reconciliation of posi tions of its participants and provides for institutional engagement of citizens of states though their parliaments. These parliaments directly interact in the framework of the subsidiarity control mechanism with supranational institutions exercising regulating competencies of the EU, which is recognized as a basic guarantee that positions of all interested and affected stakeholders will be taken into consideration in supranational legislative decisions to the fullest extent. And even though a qualified majority in the Council and/or a majority in the European Parliament is required for passing legis lative decisions, this aspect of the legislative process nonetheless does not offset the purely interinstitutional nature of this process.
In its turn, it is important to note that decisions of the Council of the EEC (as a body exercising oversight functions over EEC activities), also require a consensus. If one is not reached an issue under question is passed for consideration to the Supreme Council (Clause 29 of the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission annexed to the Treaty). However, the situation with the Eurasian consensus is of quite a differ ent type: given that the Council of the EEC consists of five vicepremiers representing national governments of EAEU members, it would be unreasonable to claim that this body, as well as the decisionmaking procedure that it has developed, is interinstitu tional by their nature.
The genuinely consensual nature of supranational decisions provides an avenue for their procedural legitimacy and, therefore, for the uncomplicated implementation by all participants of integration relations involved in adoption of these decisions as well as in their direct application by citizens. It appears to be the main lesson learned from integration development in the EU, where interinstitutional consensus has become a gold standard for the legal approximation of states. 
